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ABSTRACT 
Quickly after the 9/11 event, the state of Florida drafted one of the Nation’s first 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategies to aid in the protection of the state’s visitors 
and citizens. This strategy was drafted early in the new paradigm of Homeland Security. 
The strategy had several modifications over the years but has not had a comprehensive 
review since its inception. Many things have changed in the arena of Homeland Security 
since that first step after the 9/11 event. The analysis of interviews from Florida 
Homeland Security Leaders, and other states’ homeland security strategies in 
combination with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) six desirable 
characteristics demonstrates the need for Florida to develop the next iteration of its 
domestic security strategy. This thesis recommends using the strengths of Florida’s 
Regional Domestic Security Task Force, the Department of Homeland Security Target 
Capability List, and the GAO desirable characteristics combined with traditional 
elements of strategic planning to be the pillars of this new iteration of the strategy.  A 
new vision and mission statement based on a traditional strategic planning tool will be the 
first step in building a new storyline for Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sun Tzu wrote, if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not 
fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the 
enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know 
neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.  
(Clavell, 1983, p.18) 
Prior to the 9/11 event, Florida did not have a Homeland Security or Domestic 
Security Strategy for the state. Quickly after September 11, 2001, Florida’s top leadership 
joined together to draft the “Nation’s first comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy” 
(Florida Division of Emergency Management [FDEM], 2008, p. 3). The document 
entitled Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy commenced as terrorism centric and moved 
towards an all hazards approach with the most recent version being adopted on August 8, 
2007 by the leadership of Florida’s Domestic Security Oversight Committee (DSOC). 
The present document has been modified slightly over the past seven (7) years and 
consists of only five (5) pages. The underlining argument of this thesis is for the state of 
Florida to rewrite its states Domestic Security Strategy. The paradigm of Homeland 
Security has changed since the 9/11 event and Florida must change its strategy to better 
protect its citizens and visitors for the future. This thesis will explore methods of 
developing a strategic strategy and review other states’ homeland security strategies for 
best practices to be utilized by Florida and other states in the future. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Should a Seven-Year-Old Strategic Plan Consisting of Five Pages 
Really be the Storyline for Florida’s Domestic Security?  
Does a strategic strategy drafted in 2001 still have the same relevance today to 
guide Florida’s Leadership in its decision making in the realm of homeland security? The 
idea of strategic planning can be capsulated as, “My own view is that both leadership and 
management involve both doing the right things and doing them well, but if we stick with 
this rather simplistic distinction for a moment, strategic planning is first and foremost 
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about clarifying mission, mandates, vision, goals, and the nature of the common good and 
public value to be created-doing the right things-whereas management is about making 
sure those things are done well through strategies and operations at reasonable costs” 
(Bryson, 2004, p. 15).   
A second thought process on strategic thinking has changed from a “road map” to 
a “compass” model because we are in a wilderness – the stream, the environment, is so 
unpredictable that road maps are worthless (Covey, 1991, p. 166). An argument can be 
made that Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy misses the mark on clarifying mission, 
mandates, vision, and goals, which is at the heart of strategic planning.  
2. What Method Should Florida’s Leadership Utilize to Enhance its 
Domestic Security Strategy?  
A second question concerning the development of Florida’s Domestic Security 
Strategy pertains to what variables were considered at the time of its development and are 
these variables still a driving force today. The process of creating a strategic strategy can 
have an impact on the effectiveness of the final product. The 9/11 event created chaos for 
governmental agencies charged with protecting its citizens. Florida’s Domestic Security 
Strategy was born out of this chaos as the first step into this new paradigm of homeland 
security. An interview of a Homeland Security Leader involved in the original 
development of Florida’s Strategy identified three overarching themes impacting the 
process: (1) Four Focus Groups were used to provide feedback, (2) Florida was the first 
state to construct a strategy for this new discipline of Homeland Security with no prior 
available context, and (3) the emergent need for a strategy overshadowed taking the time 
to address all the possible steps of a strategic process (Interview of Anonymous 
Homeland Security Leader, 2008). Seven years later, Florida still has the same strategy 
with no defined process or methodology for change. Once the initial strategy was 
developed, Florida chose to wait on applicable federal guidance from the Department of 
Homeland Security before changing its official strategy. Should Florida commence down 
the path of developing a new homeland security strategy and if so how? 
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Florida’s 2007 Domestic Security Strategy consists of five pages with a vision 
statement, mission statement, five goals, and thirty-seven objectives. The Strategy, 
however, misses the mark. It fails to include many of the critical, desirable characteristics 
of strategic plans, and as a result, does not provide a sufficient framework to guide the 
state’s program initiatives and budgetary priorities.  
Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy’s mission has remained constant through the 
different iterations since its inception in October 2001. Florida’s mission statement is to 
“Strengthen our coordinated capability to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover 
from all hazards through interdisciplinary and interagency consensus and commitment to 
build and rely on a strong Regional Collaboration” (Florida Domestic Security Strategy 
[FDSS], 2007, p. 1). Florida’s strategy also contains a vision statement articulated as, 
“Florida: working together for a safe and secure future” (FDSS, 2007, p. 1). A mission 
statement gives meaning to an organization. Developing a mission statement will take 
time but it is the essence of an organization, the battle cry, for the organization. Several 
different methods can be used to develop a mission statement. One perspective has a 
philosophical base by which the organization answers a series of questions. The questions 
the organization needs to answer to create the Socratic dialogue are: 
1. Who are we? 
2. What are the basic social and political needs we exist to meet, or what are 
the basic social or political problems we exist to address? 
3. In general, what do we do to recognize, anticipate, and respond to these 
needs or problems? 
4. How should we respond to our key stakeholders? 
5. What are our philosophy, values, and culture? 
6. What makes us distinctive or unique? (Bryson, 2004, pp. 114-117) 
The questions ask the organization to find its identity and unique purpose. The 
strategic path leads from the mission statement and reflects its vision and values and also 
reflects the environment realities, the stream, so that obsolete products or services are not 
being produced (Covey, 1991, p. 167). Globalization has caused increased competition 
amongst organizations, which forces them to adapt or lose their competitive edge.    
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3. Florida’s Domestic Security Mission Analyzed via Socratic Mission 
Questions 
The who are we question is never really addressed in Florida’s Domestic Security 
Strategy. It mentions interdisciplinary, interagency, and regional collaboration but never 
really puts a face with this effort. Before the other questions can be adequately answered, 
the organization needs to be identified which then can bring clarity to some of the other 
questions.   
The second question of what are the basic social or political problems we exist to 
address has meaning to a homeland security strategy. This question is partially answered 
within Florida’s mission statement by the phase, “capability to prepare, prevent, protect, 
respond, and recover from all hazards.” The argument could be made that the term all 
hazards could be further defined to provide more clarity to the problems the strategy is 
trying to address or the public value the strategy tries to provide.  
The third question of, what do we do to recognize, anticipate, and respond to 
these needs, or problems are partially answered by the words of interdisciplinary, 
interagency consensus and regional collaboration. Further efforts or discussions need to 
occur to better answer the question within the strategy.  
The fourth question pertains to key stakeholders, how should we respond to our 
key stakeholders? Florida’s strategy does not address the identification of any key 
stakeholders. The strategy does mention strong regional collaboration but does not go the 
extra step to identify who at the regional level are key stakeholders.  
The fifth question focuses on the inner culture of an organization. This question 
will be a little more difficult for a state homeland security strategy to address, since it 
takes numerous agencies working together to produce public value. The question asks 
organizations to identify its philosophy, values, and culture. Florida’s strategy partially 
addresses this question by inserting the words consensus, strong and commitment. The 




especially pertaining to the public. The philosophy and culture could influence the 
success level of the organization. Failure is not an option for a state’s homeland security 
strategy.  
The final question pertains to an organization’s longevity in this ever changing 
global environmental. Organizations should ask the question what makes us distinctive or 
unique. This question could influence the state’s competitiveness for federal funding. The 
federal grant funding process every year is becoming more and more competitive in 
nature. One state’s uniqueness could add to the overall score of its application. Florida’s 
strategy partially addresses uniqueness by using the words regional collaboration but 
needs to take the next step to set Florida above the rest. 
The Florida Strategy lists five goals for the strategy, which are compatible to past 
National Strategies on Homeland Security: 
1. PREPARE for terrorism response missions 
2. PREVENT, preempt and deter acts of terrorism 
3. PROTECT Florida’s citizens, visitors, and critical infrastructure 
4. RESPOND in an immediate, effective, and coordinated manner, focused 
on the victims of the attack.  
5. RECOVER quickly and restore our way of life following a terrorist act. 
(FDSS, 2007, pp. 1-5). 
The strategy addresses strategic goals but never lists any performance measures, 
milestones, or organizational roles of accomplishing the goals or its assigned objectives.  
The State’s Domestic Security Strategy can be compared to the U.S. General 
Accountability Office’s (GAO) set of desirable characteristics for implementing domestic 
security strategies. GAO’s approach focuses on a plan’s scope, methodology, problem 
definition, risk assessment, activities, performance measures, resources, investments, risk 
management, organizational roles, responsibilities, coordination, integration, and 
implementation (GAO, 2004, p. 4). Since Florida’s strategy lacks the identification of any 
organization or agency, Florida’s plan strikingly falters on its attention to organizational 
responsibilities. The document lacks numerous characteristics to include the lack of one 
agency by name or its responsibilities to enhance the implementation of the document. 
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The strategy was formed to tackle the strategic issue of protecting a state’s homeland 
security. Does the present strategy create public value? It could be argued the document 
lacks clarity, which hinders the usefulness in providing domestic security to the citizens 
and visitors of Florida. A concern for Florida’s Leadership developed over expanding the 
strategy or wait for further guidance from the federal government to have a cohesive plan 
that tied into the federal overarching national plan. Florida Leadership decided to wait 
instead of developing enhancements and then having to spend the time and effort to 
redraft to comply with the federal guidance.  
An interview of a Florida Homeland Security Leader revealed “the reason Florida 
did not expand its domestic security strategy was due to the ever changing grant guidance 
from the Department of Homeland Security” (Interview of Anonymous Homeland 
Security Leader, 2008). This thought is supported in the Department of Homeland 
Security document issued in 2005 entitled, “State and Urban Area Homeland Security 
Strategy” (DHS, 2005). The document provided the following guidance, “In the future, 
States and Urban Areas will be asked to develop enterprise-wide homeland security 
strategies for 2007, 2008, and 2009 that reflect the necessary integration and 
collaboration across all mission areas and support the establishment of the National 
Preparedness System and realization of the Goal” (DHS, 2005, p. 8). The 2005 federal 
guidance further advised states, “In the future, States and Urban Areas will be asked to 
more completely revise their strategies to address their goals, objectives, mission 
statements and preparedness vision for 2007-2009” (DHS, 2005, p. 21). Florida believes 
it to be prudent to wait for complete guidance from the federal government before 
overhauling its existing state strategy.  
4. What Steps Should Florida Leadership Use to Enhance the 
Effectiveness of its Strategy? 
Several different models of strategy development exist from the military and the 
business world. One such model is the Strategy Change Cycle. The cycle has ten steps, 
which an organization will progress through to reach a final strategy. Parts of this 
formula will be leveraged to aid Florida to enhance its homeland security strategy.   
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B. ANALYSIS 
The blending of the GAO desirable characteristics, strategy change cycle, and 
best practices of other states’ homeland security strategies will provide a foundation for 
Florida to build upon in developing the next iteration of its domestic security strategy. 
Utilizing the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security will ensure Florida’s 
Domestic Security Strategy will be aligned with the national goals for our nation’s 
homeland security. The Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan has many of the GAO 
desirable characteristics contained within its strategy. The Texas Plan could be used as a 
reference point for Florida.  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the best practices drawn from a wide 
array of states’ strategic plans and a well-defined planning cycle to begin to reformulate 
Florida’s statewide Strategic Plan. Characteristics from existing plans and using a defined 
method in the progression of developing the plan will create synergy and lessen the 
possibility of gaps in the strategic plan. A strong strategic plan with desirable 
characteristics and an end date will provide the needed compass to protect the citizens 
and visitors to any state in the nation.   
C.  METHODOLOGY 
A triangulation approach will be taken by using interviews of Florida Homeland 
Security Leaders and review of Homeland Security Strategies drafted by other states and 
Florida Urban Area Security Initiatives. The analysis will focus on taking strengths and 
opportunities, which will work to neutralize weaknesses and threats facing Florida’s 
Domestic Security Program.  
A review of strategic planning tools, concepts, and methods will be the starting 
point for this thesis. A tool or concept will be chosen which has application to the arena 
of homeland security.  Several state and national strategies will be researched to find 
commonalities that make sense to be part of a state’s homeland security strategic plan.  
Florida at this time has five Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI), which are mandated 
to have a Homeland Security Strategy. The five strategies will be reviewed and compared 
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to the GAO desirable characteristics so that a template can be designed to ensure all 
UASI’s and the state plan are aligned with and connected to provide a seamless message 
to all stakeholders.  
Interviews of several Florida Homeland Security Leaders will be conducted to 
identify the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) facing Florida 
and its Domestic Security Program. Focusing on the positives will be injected into the 
process to see what is going right and incorporate those ideas in redrafting the Mission, 
Vision, and Objectives of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy.  
The final piece will consist of recommendations or ideas of what a homeland 
security strategy should address to provide guidance and accountability to organizations 
involved in the new discipline of homeland security. The suggestions could have 
relevance for any public or private organization that has a mission of homeland security. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
Since the 9/11 event, numerous Homeland Security Strategies (HSS) have been 
developed throughout the United States. Many states’ and governmental organizations 
have established Homeland Security strategies to guide their jurisdictional philosophy. 
This review focuses on literature that deals with traditional characteristics of strategy 
development that has been used by the military and businesses. Several selected state 
Homeland Security strategies will also be researched for this thesis. 
2. Literature on Characteristics of Strategy 
Strategy formulation methods or schools have been around for centuries. Many of 
the schools began to take shape in the 1960’s. Several different ways and different 
schools of thought can define strategy. Author Henry Mintzberg and others have defined 




School Strategy Formation 
1. Design  As a process on conception 
2. Planning  As a formal process 
3. Positioning  As an analytical process 
4. Entrepreneurial  As a visionary process 
5. Cognitive  As a mental process 
6. Learning  As an emergent process 
7. Power  As a process of negotiation 
8. Cultural  As a collective process 
9. Environmental As a reactive process 
10. Configuration As a process of transformation (Mintzberg et 
al., 2005, p. 5) 
Many of the ideas can be applied to states’ homeland security strategies.  
The U.S. Army War College identifies a different set of terms or characteristics 
for developing strategies. “Strategy formulation is recognized as both an art and science, 
and the U.S. Army War College strategy model of ends, ways, and means is expounded 
on and advocated as a methodology for articulating strategies” (Yarger, 2006 p. ix). This 
strategy model is further defined as, ends (where we are going), ways (how we are going 
to get there), and means (how we organize the resource) (Covey, 1991, p. 166).  
Another approach to strategic planning is the Strategy Change Cycle, which is 
typically fluid, iterative, and dynamic in practice but nonetheless allows for a reasonably 
orderly, participative and effective approach to determining how best to achieve what is 
best for an organization and create real public value (Bryson, 2004, p. 2). The process has 




Table 1.   Strategy Change Cycle  
 
The Cycle does more than just create a strategic document. The Cycle is intended to 
move the organization to think and act strategically and be able to implement the actions 
needed to receive the desired results. The new paradigm of Homeland Security will 
demand leaders find new, technically workable, and intelligent ways to protect our 
communities. 
A final approached researched was identified by The United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO) with its six desirable characteristics for implementing 
strategies: (1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk 
assessment; (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; (4) 
resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational roles, responsibilities, 
and coordination; and (6) integration and implementation (GAO, GAO-04-408T, 2004, p. 
11). The GAO applied these characteristics to seven existing national strategies. The 


























weaknesses were in the following areas: (1) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and 
performance measures; (2) resources, investments, and risk management; and (3) 
integration and implementation.  
The GAO characteristics has a weakness due to the lack of the concepts of a 
mission and vision statement. The Strategy Change Cycle places emphasis early on in the 
cycle for the organization to determine its mission and vision. These two elements are 
traditionally addressed early in an organization’s strategy.  
3. Emerging Strategy in Homeland Security 
An emerging strategy in homeland security is Capabilities-Based Planning, which 
identifies many of the characteristics identified by the GAO. Capabilities-Based Planning 
speaks to needs, priorities, resources, critical tasks, and capabilities. The Department of 
Homeland Security has developed the Target Capability List (TCL) as a guide to local 
governments to aid in drafting homeland security doctrine. The Department of Homeland 
Security Target Capabilities List was issued in 2007 consisting of 37 target capabilities. 
The TCL is a national document for all states to use in developing their individual 
homeland security strategy plans. Besides building a strong state capability, the use of the 
TCL can also build a national framework to strengthen our nation.  
4. The Federal Homeland Security Strategy 
The Office of Homeland Security released the first National Strategy for 
Homeland Security in 2002. The strategy was drafted in response to the 9/11 event. The 
national strategy consisted of the following subject areas; (1) threat and vulnerability, (2) 
organizing for a secure homeland, (3) intelligence and warning, (4) border and 
transportation security, (5) domestic counterterrorism, (6) protecting critical 
infrastructures and key assets, (7) defending against catastrophic threats, (8) emergency 
preparedness and response, (9) law, (10) science and technology, (11) information 
sharing and systems, (12) international cooperation, (13) costs of homeland security, and 
(14) priorities for the future (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. v). This was the 
watershed event, which commenced the journey for states to develop a homeland security 
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strategy for their jurisdiction. Arguably, the national strategy was drafted during chaotic 
times with an ever-present need for a call to action to protect America. The strategy has 
several gaps in key desirable characteristics. The 2002 strategy had gaps in the 
characteristics of goals, subordinate objectives, performance measures, resources, 
investments, risk management, intergradation, and implementation (GAO, 2004, p. 4).  In 
October 2007, the United States Homeland Security Council released the second version 
of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  
The new version of the national strategy continues to lack certain desirable 
characteristics to include organizational roles, responsibilities, resources, investments, 
subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures. Furthermore, the new 
strategy lacks a timeframe for implementation and updating the strategy.   
5. State Homeland Security Strategies 
The literature review of the actual homeland security strategy for individual states 
was based on open source availability via their established websites. States may utilize 
other documents, which are exempt from public disclosure, that support their homeland 
security program, and consequently, not all of the material on state strategies exists in the 
public sphere. Several of the state strategies have many of the same gaps as the federal 
strategy such as, characteristics of goals, subordinate objectives, performance measures, 
resources, investments, risk management, intergradation, and implementation.  
The state of Florida’s homeland security strategy has some characteristics of 
vision, mission, and over arching goals. The goals are based on the national strategy of 
prevent, prepare, protect, respond and recover. Each goal has a series of subordinate 
objectives to bolster the over arching goal (Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council, 
2007, pp. 1-5).  
Florida’s homeland security strategy is anemic or nonexistent in the 
characteristics of scope, methodology, problem definition, risk assessment, activities, 
performance measures, resources, investments, risk management, organizational roles, 
responsibilities, coordination, integration, and implementation. Two major flaws in the 
strategy are organizational responsibilities and the operational timeframe of the strategy. 
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The strategy fails to answer the question of who is in charge during a major catastrophic 
event and is unclear with respect to how long the state will operate under its present 
strategy. The state of Texas has a very robust homeland security strategic plan (HSSP), 
which starts with the operational existence (five years) and identifies which agencies are 
responsible for implementation of the plan. The plan touches on numerous desirable 
characteristics such as purpose, scope, methodology, problem definition, risk assessment, 
goals, subordinate objectives, activities, resources, risk mitigation, organizational roles, 
responsibilities, implementation, coordination, and integration (Perry, 2005, pp. 1-49). 
However, the Texas HSSP does not address investments and performance measures. The 
HSSP identifies goals and activities but fails in costs and investments to accomplish the 
goals. The document lacks any type of performance measure methodology or milestones 
to measure the results of the HSSP.  
The state of Massachusetts released their new Homeland Security Strategy in 
September 2007 via the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security. The strategy 
addresses some of the GAO desirable characteristics but lacks clarity in risk assessment, 
problem identification, methodology, activities, resources, and performance 
measurements (Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, 2007, pp. 
1-31).  
The state of Iowa revised their Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
Strategy in December 2006 via the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management Division. The strategy addresses or partially addresses every one of the 
GAO’s desirable characteristics. Iowa, like Texas, has developed a comprehensive 
homeland security strategy to guide their state’s efforts. Iowa’s strategy links up with 
many of the attributes of the National Homeland Strategy. The final strength is the 
established timeline of the plan. This plan calls for bi-annual reports and a complete 
review after 2008, which is a three-year strategy (Miller, 2006, pp. 1-36). 
The Office of Homeland Security released the state of California Homeland 
Security Strategy in 2007. California’s strategy addresses several of the desirable 
characteristics to include, organizational roles, coordination, integration, purpose and 
scope (California Governor’s Office of Homeland Security, 2007, pp. 1-62). California’s 
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strategy lacks depth in performance measures, subordinate objectives, activities, and risk 
assessment. California, in the summer of 2008, released its next iteration of their 
Homeland Security Strategy (California Governor’s Office of Homeland Security, 2008, 
pp. 1-100). California’s new strategy still has gaps relating to performance 
measurements, resource investments and risk management. 
6. Summary 
The 2002 National Strategy identifies responsibilities for disaster as, “Ultimately, 
all manmade and natural disasters are local events-with local units being the first to 
respond and the last to leave” (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 12). Clearly, this 
was true in 2002 and still resonates throughout this country. Since 2002, numerous things 
have changed in homeland security’ the Department of Homeland Security became 
operational, the Director of National Intelligence was created to change the federal 
Intelligence Community, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, fusion centers, 
and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) were developed and changed from 
terrorism centric to an all hazards approach. Billions of tax dollars have been spent to 
purchase things to enhance homeland security in furtherance of the national strategy. It is 
not clear, however, which activities and performance measures these expenditures 
succeeded in enhancing. The National Strategy and other states HSS lack this type of 
information.  
Comparing Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy to other states and the national 
strategy has identified a resounding gap in several desirable characteristics consisting of: 
(1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; (3) 
goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; (4) resources, 
investments, and risk management; (5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and 
coordination; and (6) integration and implementation. The next step for Florida in 
enhancing its present strategy is to identify the present status of the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that Florida faces for the future. Those factors then 
can create the foundation for which Florida can create a new storyline for its strategy.    
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II. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND 
THREATS (SWOT) ANALYSIS FOR FLORIDA 
Organizations must understand the environment they operate in every day. The 
information age makes this even more critical than past years due to the speed of change 
and the global information exchange. An important step in developing a strategic change 
process concerns analyzing the environment the organization competes in for relevance. 
The environment is comprised of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats 
which an organization must navigate through in this new global age. An organization by 
analyzing its internal and external environments can take its strengths and opportunities 
to influence the weaknesses and threats it faces.   
A. SWOT ANALYSIS 
The SWOT analysis method stands for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats the organization may face. Strengths and weaknesses pertain to the present status 
of the internal workings of the organization. An organization will have more control of its 
strengths and weaknesses versus its opportunities and threats. Opportunities and threats 
identify the outside forces influencing an organization. Organizations have less control 
over the opportunities and threats it faces. The underlining goal of the strategy for the 
organization is to maximize its strengths and opportunities and neutralize the weaknesses 
and threats it faces. The strategy needs to make sense and add value to the organization.  
A useful tool for assessing the environment is the use of scenarios an organization 
may face during its normal course of business. The creativity of terrorists today spans 
from airplanes used as gasoline-filled bombs to Improved Explosive Devices (IED) will 
challenge homeland security leaders to explore the unknown to find the next possible 
catastrophic scenario. 
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B. SWOT OF FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY PROGRAM 
PERSPECTIVE BASED ON LITERATURE REVIEW 
The state of Florida has received hundreds of millions of federal grant dollars 
since 911 to enhance its capabilities to respond and prevent natural and man-made 
disasters. The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats were developed from 
researching materials published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
Office, National Homeland Security Strategy, Department of Homeland Security Grant 
Guidance, Florida Division of Emergency Management State Preparedness Report, and 
knowledge gathered as part of the Florida Domestic Security Apparatus. This list is by no 
means exhaustive but a beginning for Florida homeland security professionals to explore. 
The federal grant dollars have created or influenced the following strengths: 
 
Strengths 
1. Creation of various Specialty Teams to include Bomb, SWAT, 
Waterborne Response, Forensic Response, Urban Search & Rescue and 
Hazmat 
2. Seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) which are multi 
disciplined and provide regional collaboration 
3. National Incident Management System (NIMS) compliant 
4. Adoption of Incident Command System (ICS) 
5. Expanded Florida Interoperability Network (FIN) 
6. Past history of responding to major hurricanes and events 
The above are some of the strengths which Florida’s leaders can utilize to prevent or 
respond to any disaster in the state.  
Besides strengths, Florida’s Domestic Security Program has several weaknesses 
facing the program: 
Weaknesses 
1. Sustainment funding for Specialty Teams 
2. No statewide data sharing system 
3. Five Independent Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI) 
4. Independent funding process for UASI’s and State Homeland Security 
grant funds 
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5. State Domestic Security Strategy independent of five UASI’s Homeland 
Security Strategies. 
6. Strike Teams identified by Centralized Command not a Regional 
Response 
7. Lack of Comprehensive State Strategy to give Florida a storyline for its 
Domestic Security Program 
8. Lack of use of Target Capabilities List (TCL) 
The above lists of strengths and weaknesses is not a complete list just a start.    
The next phase looks at opportunities and threats, which are outside the 
organization’s control. The below list is not all-inclusive but just a start: 
Opportunities 
1. Florida is one of the fastest growing states in the nation 
2. Change of Power in Cuba 
3. Military Commands based in Florida 
4. Technology Advancements 
5. Regional Domestic Security Task Forces 
6. Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Programs 
Organizations need to be cognizant of outside threats, which they may face: 
Threats 
1. Fifteen (15) National Planning Scenarios 
2. Budget Reductions and Cuts in State Revenue Funding 
3. Budget Reductions in Federal Funding for Homeland Security 
4. Price of Fuel and Crude Oil  
5. Radicalization of US citizens to al-Qaeda 
6. Foreign cargo from China landing in Florida Port 
7. Low percentage of incoming cargo being screened by port authorities 
C. SWOT OF FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY PROGRAM FROM THE 
EYES OF SEVERAL FLORIDA HOMELAND SECURITY LEADERS 
Eight interviews were conducted of Florida Homeland Security Leaders to add 
value to the above SWOT process. The Florida Leaders came from the North, Central, 
and South regions of the state. The leaders came from different backgrounds to include 
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Fire, Emergency Management, Health, Law Enforcement, and the Urban Area Security 
Initiatives.  The leaders were given complete anonymity in the hopes of gathering candid 
information.  
The interviews reflected the following insight: 
Results of Eight Interviews (* Signifies duplicate response) 
Strengths 
1. RDSTF Regional Approach**** 
2. Multi-Discipline Approach****** 
3. Robust Emergency Management Apparatus* 
4. Strong Governor 
5. Strong Communication among the Disciplines** 
6. Most Planning in Florida is linked to gaps and the National Guidance 
7. Most Regions in Florida look at doing the best for the most rather than just 
giving funding to those most politically affiliated 
8. Use of Target Capabilities List (TCL)* 
9. Comprehensive phases of threat & impact 
10. Consensus Building on what is needed 
Weaknesses 
1. Minimized State Law Enforcement Involvement 
2. Lack of Asset Typing for Teams and Equipment 
3. Designation of Co-Chairs by State Statute (No room for change) 
4. Non base Risk Assessment Statewide view * 
5. Weak State Strategic Plan 
6. Silos remain within each Discipline* 
7. Competitive Funding should be based on need rather than population* 
8. No Succession Planning 
9. Some decisions are made by people on top of organizational chart and 
may not have the insight of the “boots on the ground” 
10. Large Urban Areas receiving more representation 
11. Lack of Target Capabilities (TCL) & Uniform Task Lists (UTL) 
12. Vulnerable to changes in funding which potentially impact ability to 
accomplish mission 
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13. Domestic Security Program and Strategy is not fully integrated into day-
to-day operations 
14. Not enough people are familiar with it (Responders, Elected Officials) 
15. Overlaps of FS 252 & FS 943 in state strategy which creates grey areas 
and reduces clarity 
16. Heavily skewed towards Law Enforcement at highest levels of program 
17. Out of the 67 counties, most are medium to small in size which creates a 
political voting block that resists risk and threat approaches 
18. UASI since its inception has been resisted and the state has ignored its 
requirements and strategic elements as deliverables per federal 
requirement. 
19. Struggle for dominance; power control of money 
20. Unnecessary funding of Projects 
21. Lack capability for sustainment 
22. Lack of funding for personnel 
23. Lack of regional coordinator for each discipline to help track and 
coordinate effort 
24. Weak Regional Response Plans 
25. Constant eminence due to size of membership 
Opportunities 
1. Better definition of Homeland Security 
2. More defined spending practices due to reduced federal funding 
3. Recognition of the RDSTF Structure as a best practice* 
4. Funding linked to good performance 
5. Use of HSEEP for exercises 
6. State Strategy process can be a model for other states 
7. Florida representatives with success in their discipline to consult with 
other states to align the National Strategy 
8. Leverage no cost of training offered by DHS, FEMA and EMI 
9. Once integrated strategy to include TCL’s & UTL’s effective gap analysis 
can be conducted 
10. Integrate/link with other hazard-based programs for planning, response, 
recovery, prevention, mitigation 
11. Create one all hazard, all discipline plan that has equity for all major 
disciplines 
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12. Reform and combine FS 252 & FS 943 
13. Regionalization to stop duplications 
14. Each region could have a level of expertise 
15. Structure allows for private partners 
Threats 
1. Attacks on Transportation System (Rail, Bridges, Tunnels, Highways) * 
2. Unprotected Tourism Industry* 
3. Lack of Partnership with Tourism Industry 
4. Overwhelming Florida Sheriffs Association power on program 
5. Federal Funding being depleted** 
6. Training and exercise fatigue 
7. Apathy from not having an incident to keep preparedness in the 
forefront** 
8. Loss of institutional knowledge due to loss of key personnel 
9. Domestic as well as International Terrorists 
10. Natural Disasters* 
11. Changing of UASI footprint by federal government loss of funds 
12. Local & Regional resistance to outcomes of gap analysis* 
13. Mandating a redirection of funding 
14. Issuing funding in uniform fashion regardless of risk 
15. Hazardous Materials 
16. Lack of security at small airports 
17. Changing demographics in state 
18. Lack of established minimal levels of response for rural and urban areas 
19. Existing resistance to organizational change produces vulnerabilities 
20. Poor coordination with major cities increases the threat of poor operational 
coordination with major municipalities 
21. The State’s reliance on the 67 counties as the absolute method to deal with 
structure, operations, and resources needs to be revisited 
22. Disenfranchisement of Florida’s major cities has deleterious effects 
23. Resistance to participatory inclusion at the Domestic Security Oversight 




24. International Terrorist Groups 
25. Domestic Terrorist Groups 
The leaders were also asked this final question, Should we change or modify our 
present state domestic security strategy? The following responses were recorded: 
1. Yes. There are several options for this. Most change would be 
unpopular 
2. Yes. Absolutely. Raise expectations of RDSTF & DSOC. Raise 
involvement of Governor, Cabinet, and Legislature. Raise the 
measurement of the program. More Global State Strategy. Raise 
involvement of small agencies & Non Governmental Agencies. 
3. Yes.  It is a living document and must be reviewed on a regular basis. 
Need to make adjustments to move forward. 
4. Yes.  Absolutely due to lack of TCL’s and UTL’s  
5. Yes.  Mission Statement could be clarified – needs to be more clearly 
stated. 
6. Yes.  It excludes participatory equity on the part of the major disciplines. 
It prevents the application of risk-based approaches. It is clouded by 
duplicitous, old strategy that is due for updating, particularly to 
consolidate FS 252 and FS 943. 
7. Yes.  Prudent review of the State Domestic Security Strategy 
demonstrates the need to assess the inclusion of a goal relative to the need 
for multi-agency coordination. 
8. Yes.  Need to change based on change in culture and events 
D. OVERVIEW OF SWOT INTERVIEWS  
The primary key strengths to Florida’s Domestic Security Program were 
identified as the Regional Domestic Security Task Force configuration, the Multi-
Discipline Approach, robust Emergency Management Apparatus, and Strong 
Communication among Disciplines.  These positive actions need to be reinforced in the 
development future iterations of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy.  The second 
overarching point is the need for Florida to update its Domestic Security Strategy. The 
interviews produced an overwhelming support for Florida to update its strategy. Several 
of the weaknesses identified were lack of use of the Target Capability List (TCL), weak 
state strategic plan, weak regional response plans, and lack of clarity between state 
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statutes governing emergency response and resisting the UASI program. Key 
opportunities identified consisted of Regional Domestic Security Task Force structure as 
a best practice, regionalization to stop duplications, each region could have a level of 
expertise, create one all hazard and discipline plan with equity, and the TCL can impact 
present gaps in the program. Threats ran the gamut from terrorist groups to natural 
disasters and reduced federal funding for homeland security. Apathy from the lack of an 
incident and Florida’s reliance of 67 counties as the absolute method to deal with 
structure, operations, and response can be minimized by a strong strategic plan.   
E. SUMMARY  
The SWOT is more than just making lists and going through the motions. The 
process calls for analysis and to be completed on a regular basis by the organization. 
Florida’s Domestic Security Program would be well served to complete a SWOT analysis 
at least once a year. Several federal documents can help provide a framework for the 
analysis such as the Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment, 
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the annual Department of Homeland 
Security Grant Guidance. These documents can provide a piece of the national picture of 
potential threats, which local homeland security professionals can dissect for applicability 
to their local jurisdiction. The arena of homeland security has changed since the 911 
event. It is a safe bet that change will continue on a rapid pace for at least the near future. 
Organizations need to assess their environment at least once a year to attempt to stay 
current. A major change since 911 is the development the federal Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) program that is administrated by the United States Department of 
Homeland Security. Florida has received millions of dollars via this program to enhance 
its homeland security. The designated UASI sites are stakeholders in Florida’s Domestic 
Security Program and need to be part of the process.  
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III. REVIEW OF FLORIDA’S URBAN AREA SECURITY 
INITIATIVE (UASI) HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIES 
A. URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVES (UASI) IN FLORIDA 
The designated UASI sites in Florida as of May 2008 consist of Jacksonville, 
Orlando, Tampa, Miami, and Fort Lauderdale. Every year the federal government 
determines which cities and counties will be designated as UASI sites. The makeup of 
each UASI site has a different regional flavor due to its population and geographical 
composite. The local leadership was able to identify the core city and counties as part of 
the grant application. The Department of Homeland Security is in the process of 
developing nationwide guidance on the geographical standards for UASI sites. It is 
unknown at this time what affect if any the 2008 guidance will have on the existing 
Florida UASI sites. 
The Jacksonville UASI core city/county is the consolidated city of Jacksonville 
and Duval County. The city and county municipal services are combined under one 
governmental entity. The Jacksonville Leadership when applying for the UASI 
designation expanded the core city/county concept to incorporate the other twelve (12) 
counties of the Regional Domestic Security Task Force. The Jacksonville UASI was the 
first UASI to take this broad approach for its grant submission. The most recent 
Homeland Security Strategy for the Jacksonville UASI was adopted in October 2007 
entitled Jacksonville Urban Area Security Initiative 2008 Homeland Security Strategy 
(Jacksonville UASI, 2007).    
The Orlando UASI has a core city of Orlando with the core county of Orange. 
The Orlando UASI expanded to five (5) other counties but does not encompass the 
complete Regional Domestic Security Task Force. The additional counties consist of 
Seminole, Lake, Osceola, Volusia, and Brevard. The Orlando UASI operates under the 
most recent version of their homeland security strategy entitled Orlando/Orange Urban 
Area Security Initiative 2006 Strategy (Orlando UASI, 2006).  
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The Tampa UASI has a core city of Tampa with the core county of Hillsborough. 
The Tampa UASI expanded its geographical boundaries to include the cities of St. 
Petersburg and Clearwater, which included the county of Pinellas. Again, this UASI does 
not encompass all the counties of the Regional Domestic Security Task Force. The 
Tampa UASI operates under the most recent copy of the Tampa Bay Urban Area 
Homeland Security Strategy dated January 2006 (Tampa Bay UASI, 2006). 
The Miami UASI has a core city of Miami with the core county of Miami-Dade. 
Additionally, the UASI included the city of Hialeah and the county of Monroe. The 
Miami UASI combined with the Fort Lauderdale UASI for administrative matters upon 
its designation by the federal government. The two UASIs joined for development and 
management of the Southeast Florida Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy. The most 
recent version was revised as of March 15, 2008 (Southeast Florida Urban Area 
Homeland Security Strategy, 2008).  
The Fort Lauderdale UASI has a core city of Fort Lauderdale and core county of 
Broward. Fort Lauderdale UASI contains additional cities of Hollywood, Miami 
Gardens, Miramar, Sunrise, Pembroke Pines, Coral Springs, and the county of Palm 
Beach. The combination of the Miami and Fort Lauderdale UASI encompasses all the 
counties of the Regional Domestic Security Task Force. 
B. COMPARING FLORIDA’S UASI HOMELAND SECURITY 
STRATEGIES TO THE GAO DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS   
The GAO Desirable Characteristics identified six overarching elements in which 
to compare the UASI strategies. Each parameter was rated as A (Addresses), PA 
(Partially Addresses) or DNA (Does Not Address) the characteristic. The analysis is 






Table 2.   Florida UASI & GAO Desirable Characteristics 
  
  Florida Miami/Ft. Lauderdale Jacksonville Tampa Bay Orlando 
Purpose, Scope, 
Methodology DNA 
PA – Need  
Methodology A 
PA – Need 
Methodology 











A - Goals   
DNA – No 
mention of 
TCL 















PA – Need 
Resource 
Investment 





PA – Need 
Resource 
Investment 







































Implementation DNA A 
PA – Need 
to expand 
A - Lists a 
person's 
name who is 
responsible 
A 
 Date 8/8/2007 3/15/2008 10/1/2007 1/1/2006 1/1/2006 
 
Strengths of the Florida UASI Homeland Security strategies identify four areas. 
The strengths of USAI strategies compared to the GAO Desired Characteristics were 
identified as: 
1. Goals, Subordinate Objectives, Activities, Performance Measurements 
2. Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination 
3. Integration and Implementation 
4. Alignment with the Target Capabilities List (TCL) 
These desired characteristics would be valuable for Florida to incorporate in the next 
version of its domestic security strategy.  
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C. SUMMARY 
Florida’s Urban Area Security Initiatives have been mandated to have a more 
robust homeland security strategy to impart through federal grant guidance. Florida 
leadership can build upon this experience to enhance its domestic security strategy and 
provide an all-encompassing strategy for the state.  
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IV. REVIEW OF THREE STATE HOMELAND SECURITY 
STRATEGIES 
A. OVERVIEW OF STATES HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIES 
Several states’ homeland security strategies were reviewed in search of best 
practices. The final three states chosen to compare to Florida were Texas, Massachusetts, 
and California. These states were selected because of their size or location within the 
United States. Another factor was that these three states have an Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) contained within the state.  Each state was compared to the General 
Accounting Office Desirables Characteristics, which was developed in 2004 as a tool to 
compare National Strategies related to Terrorism (GAO, 2004, p. 4). The strategies all 
varied in size and depth of the document. 
B. COMPARING FLORIDA, TEXAS, MASSACHUSETTS AND 
CALIFORNIA TO GAO DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS   
The GAO Desirable Characteristics identified six overarching elements in which 
to compare the states strategies. Each parameter was rated as A (Addresses), PA 
(Partially Addresses) or DNA (Does Not Address) the characteristic. The analysis is 










Table 3.   State Strategies & GAO Desirable Characteristics 
  




A - Defines 
Homeland 
Security 
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A – No mention 
of TCL  
PA - No 
Performance 
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No mention of 
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A - Identifies 
UASI 



































Implementation DNA A A A 
 
 Date 8/8/2007 11/2/2005 9/1/2007 7/14/2008  
 Depth 4 pages 49 pages 30 pages 100 pages  
 
The comparison depicts Florida as having several areas of improvement it should 
entertain when developing its next iteration of its domestic security strategy. Overall, the 
state of Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan meets many of the desirable 
characteristics.  The plan contains some unique characteristics such as a definitive 
timeframe. The plan will provide guidance from 2005 to 2010, which gives the state a 
beginning and an end.  The plan begins with answering the question, “What is Homeland 
Security?” something the other states did not list (Perry, 2005, p. 2). The Texas plan ties 
in the Urban Area Security Initiative cities as partners in the strategy (Perry, 2005, p. 6).  
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C. SUMMARY 
Florida Leadership was one of the first states to draft a homeland security 
strategy. The strategy has served Florida well over the years. The picture of homeland 
security has changed since Florida’s first strategy was developed right after the 9/11 
event. Florida would be well served to update and refresh its present strategy for the 
future.   
 30
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 31
V. BUILDING A NEW STORYLINE FOR FLORIDA’S 
DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY BY ENHANCING ITS VISION 
AND MISSION STATEMENT 
A. PURPOSE OF A VISION STATEMENT 
A vision statement has different elements but the primary purpose is to create 
value. Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy commences with a vision statement. The 
vision statement is, “Florida: working together for a safe and secure future” (Florida 
Domestic Security Oversight Council, 2007, p. 1). A vision statement for a strategy 
should paint a picture for the members and stakeholders it wishes to impact. A vision for 
an organization should be challenging, easy to understand, not just one person’s dream 
but indicative of a team’s commitment and not fixed or static but capable of evolving 
over time (Tichy, 1994, p. 416). Florida’s present vision statement has some of the above 
points but needs to be enhanced in the next iteration of the strategy.   
B. NEXT ITERATION OF FLORIDA’S VISION STATEMENT FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
A possible vision statement that has some of the aforementioned attributes could 
be, “Florida will provide a Team effort to build Resiliency in every community to protect 
our citizens and visitors - One Team - One Fight.” Using the word team implies a multi-
disciplined approach involving all possible partners from emergency responders to 
private entities. The team will need a plethora of expertise to build resiliency. Resiliency 
as applied to homeland security is defined as “Applying this notion of resiliency to our 
society at the national level involves two things: mobilizing the means to reduce our 
vulnerabilities and increasing our capacity to swiftly bounce back from major man-made 
or natural disasters” (Flynn, 2007, p. xxi). This notion goes right to the heart of what this 
new discipline of Homeland Security should entail for the future. The One Team – One 
Fight gives the vision statement a slogan or a battle cry to keep the operators inspired to 
continue their efforts to protect Florida. Utilizing the word community stresses the need 
for citizen involvement besides government action to create resiliency.  
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C. PURPOSE OF A MISSION STATEMENT 
A mission statement goes hand in hand with the vision statement. A mission 
statement takes patience, a long-term perspective, and meaningful involvement-and few 
organizations rank high in those virtues (Covey, 1991, p. 165). The more stakeholders 
that are involved and impute, the better the chances are the vision and mission will be 
accepted by the masses. Florida’s most recent Domestic Security Strategy adopted the 
following mission statement; “Strengthen our coordinated capability to prepare, prevent, 
protect, respond and recover from all hazards through interdisciplinary and interagency 
consensus and commitment to build and rely on a strong Regional Collaboration” 
(Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council, 2007, p. 1). Florida’s mission statement 
has stayed the same since its inception. The only major change was to include the “all 
hazards” focus to the mission. Interviews of Florida’s Homeland Security Leaders 
overwhelmingly believe Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy needs adjustment for the 
future.  
D. NEXT ITERATION OF FLORIDA’S MISSION STATEMENT FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY  
Several strengths of Florida’s Domestic Security Program were identified from 
the interviews of Florida’s Homeland Security Leaders. Some of those attributes were the 
Regional Domestic Security Task Force Structure, Multi-Discipline Approach, Strong 
Communication, and Consensus Building.  A possible new mission statement 
incorporating many of the past ideas would be: “Strengthen our coordinated capability 
via the Regional Domestic Security Task Forces to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and 
recover from man-made or natural disasters through interdisciplinary and interagency 
consensus and commitment to build and rely on a strong regional collaboration.”  
E. SUMMARY  
The foundation of a strategy is the vision and mission statement. The vision and 
mission are the cornerstones for the rest of the process and strategy. If the foundation is 
weak, the potential for success lessens. Based on comparing other states’ vision and 
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mission statements plus the information gleamed from the Homeland Security Leaders 
interviews, Florida would be well served to enhance its present vision and mission 
statements of its Domestic Security Strategy. Identifying strengths of the past program 
successes should be the foundation for any changes in the statements. One example of a 
rewrite for Florida’s vision and mission statement was presented but by no means should 
be taken as the final answer. Florida’s State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness 
(SWG), which is comprised of subject matter experts from the Regional Domestic 
Security Task Forces should be charged to develop and enhance Florida’s vision and 
mission statement for the future. Many past and present organizations gain successes 
from a strong vision and mission statement examples such as the U.S. Marine Corps, 
NFL Football Teams, and top Fortune 500 companies.    
Another reason Florida needs to update its mission and vision statement can be 
tied into the Issue-Attention Cycle as it relates to Homeland Security. Since the United 
States has not been attacked on its soil, America will continue in stage five of the cycle. 
During stage five the “issue moves behind the public scenes and becomes the grist for 
homeland security’s congressional, industrial, academic, and bureaucratic Complex 
which is populated by professionals to refine strategies, programs, and institutions” 
(Bellavita, 2005, p. 2). A cohesive, uplifting, and inspiring mission and vision statement 
could aid Florida Homeland Security Leadership to continue its fight to protect Florida.   
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VI. USING CAPABILITY-BASED PLANNING TO BOLSTER 
FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY  
A. OVERVIEW  
Once an organization has identified its mission, vision and environmental factors 
the next phase of the Strategy Change Cycle pertains to strategic issues and strategies. 
The strategic issues and strategies could be compared to the GAO desirable 
characteristics of goals, subordinate objectives, activities, performance measures, 
resources, and investments to respond to a given strategic issue. Different schools of 
strategic thought have used different models over the years. The one that appears to be 
the most versatile for Homeland Security is the Capabilities-Based Framework. A 
working definition for Capabilities-Based Planning (CPB) developed by Paul K. Davis is 
as follows, “CPB is planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a 
wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an 
economic framework that necessitates choice” (Davis, 2002, p. xi).  
Capabilities-Based Planning contains several key elements:  
• A conceptual framework for planning under uncertainty by emphasizing 
flexibility, robustness, and adaptiveness of capability. 
• An analytical framework with three components: 
• understanding capability needs 
• assessing capability options at the level of mission or operation 
• choosing capability levels and choosing among capability options 
in an integrative portfolio framework that considers other factors 
(force management, different types of risk and economic 
limitations). 
• A solution framework that emphasizes “building blocks” (Davis, 2002, p. 




Capabilities-Based Planning with its key elements and format may make sense of 
this new paradigm of Homeland Security. A state’s Homeland Security Apparatus needs 
to be flexible, robust, and adaptable for any possible scenario involving man-made or 
natural disasters. A model for Capabilities-Based Planning is depicted in Table 4 (Davis, 
2002, p. 12). 
 
Table 4.   Process Model for Capabilities-Based Planning 
 
The process begins by identifying plausible worries, which can be construed as 
threats or scenarios. The second step is the analytical framework, which looks at needs 
and assesses potential capabilities. The third step chooses goals, requirements, and 
metrics which looks at a mission level not the complete scenario. The final step is 
assessing options or reviewing building–block capabilities for the right option.  The 
Department of Homeland Security based the National Preparedness Guidelines on a 
Capability-Based process, which is supported by three planning tools: the National 
Planning Scenarios, Target Capabilities List (TCL), and Universal Task List (UTL) 
(DHS, TCL, 2007, p. iii). 
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B. TARGET CAPABILITIES LIST (TCL)   
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published the Target 
Capabilities List (TCL) in September of 2007 as part of the National Vision of “A Nation 
Prepared” for all levels of government to include the private sector, non-government 
organizations, and citizens (DHS, TCL, 2007, p. iii). This version contained thirty-seven 
(37) core capabilities, which can be utilized to respond to a plethora of disasters. The 
TCL was not developed for every day type responses that cities and counties handle as a 
routine basis. Instead, the TCL addresses capabilities-based preparedness to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorism, very large-scale disasters, 
pandemic health emergencies, or other major incidents (DHS, TCL, 2007, p. 5). 
The first step of the TCL process was to conduct a threat and mission analysis. 
DHS in this analysis developed 15 National Planning Scenarios as a starting point to 
build the capabilities to respond, prevent, and recover from these events. One of the 
National Planning Scenarios is a major hurricane. Florida’s history of response and 
recovery capabilities from hurricanes will be a strength of the state’s domestic security 
apparatus.    
The second piece of the TCL pertains to identifying preparedness activities, 
critical tasks, measures, and metrics. These activities, measures, and metrics are applied 
to the four (4) mission areas of Prevent, Protect, Response, and Recover. The TCL 
identifies numerous activities and tasks for different mission areas. The performance 
measures and metrics for each capability define how quickly and how effectively critical 
tasks should be performed such as criticality (i.e., how quickly a specific capability is 
needed to prevent an incident, save lives, prevent suffering, or reduce major damage) is 
an important consideration in determining where a capability is needed (DHS, TCL, 
2007, p. 12). Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy contains the overarching goals or 
mission areas but lacks the breadth in spelling out the activities, tasks, measures, and 
metrics to accomplish that mission.  
A final focus of the TCL is to expand regional collaboration. Expanded Regional 
Collaboration is identified as the first priority in the National Preparedness Guidelines in 
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recognition that large-scale events may require a shared response across jurisdictions, 
levels of government, and the public/private sectors depending on the scale of the event 
(DHS, TCL, 2007, p. 11). The Department of Homeland Security by publishing the TCL 
is striving for standardization across the country. Standardization will result in states and 
regions being able to support each other in times of catastrophic disaster. Regional 
Collaboration will pool resources and spread costs across all levels of government. The 
state of Florida right after the 9/11 event developed the Regional Domestic Security Task 
Force (RDSTF) concept throughout the state. Regional Collaboration has been a mainstay 
from the first iteration of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy to the present. Florida is 
divided into seven different regions. Each region is led by a local sheriff and the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement Special in Agent in Charge. The RDSTF is mandated 
by state statute and is terrorism centric not all hazards. The below table illustrates 
Florida’s regional collaboration efforts in Table 5 (Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement, 2008): 
Table 5.   Florida’s Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) 
 
PENSACOLA 
Sheriff Charlie Morris   
SAC Jay Etheridge  
TAMPA BAY 
Sheriff David Gee   
SAC Jim Madden 
FT. MYERS 
Sheriff Mike Scott   
SAC E.J. Picolo MIAMI 
Chief Robert Parker   
SAC Amos Rojas 
ORLANDO 
Sheriff Bob 
Hansell SAC Joyce 
JACKSONVILLE 
Sheriff Ed Dean             
SAC Dominick Pape 
FLORIDA’S REGIONAL DOMESTIC 











The TCL and the National Preparedness Guidelines stress regional collaboration 
to contain multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary representation by all entities. 
Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy was built from the beginning on the need to have 
multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary partners at the table. Each Task Force has a 
series of committees encompassing a multi-disciplinary approach. The following table is 
an example of the makeup of a Regional Domestic Security Task Force (Pape, 2008): 
Table 6.   Regional Domestic Security Task Forces Committees  
 
 
Several of the GAO Desirable Characteristics are addressed within the TCL. The 
Florida Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI)’s have adopted the TCL and mention its 
use in their Homeland Security Strategy.  The TCL is a tool; a guide to help an entity 
involved in this new paradigm of Homeland Security. The TCL is a start for a 
countrywide approach. It is not the Holy Grail but has the potential to establish a baseline 
or help make sense on what a state may need to increase its preparedness.   
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C. APPLYING TARGET CAPABILITIES LIST TO FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC 
SECURITY STRATEGY  
The Target Capabilities List identifies an outcome of resilience. Resilience is key 
since it refers to our coping capacity to absorb events, adapt, respond to, and recover 
from the effects (DHS, TCL, 2007, p. vii). Each Regional Domestic Security Task Force 
with its delineated committees has the responsibility to determine the most effective 
distribution and sharing of capabilities to develop resilience for the region. The 
capabilities need to be best positioned within the region so all jurisdictions can have 
access when the need arises.  
Florida, since 2001, has coordinated the distribution of more than a billion dollars 
(primarily in federal funds) to state and local agencies to build an all hazards, scalable 
system of readiness that, through regional collaboration and mutual aid, ensures all local 
governments have the resources they need to protect citizens and visitors regardless of 
the type or magnitude of disaster (DEM, 2008, p. 3). A large portion of the funds have 
been spent for equipment, training and exercising the following Specialty Response 
Teams, Emergency Deployable Interoperable Communications, Fire/HazMat, Fire Urban 
Search & Rescue (USAR), Fire Light Technical Rescue, Special Weapons and Tactics 
(SWAT), Hazardous Device (HDT), Forensics Response, Waterborne Response, 
Aviation, Perimeter, and Incident Management Teams. The teams are positioned 
throughout the state, which spreads the capability amongst the seven Regional Domestic 
Security Task Forces (RDSTF). Many of these teams’ capabilities are listed in the TCL 
document. This gives Florida several strengths in which to build for the future.  
The first step for Florida Leadership to integrate the TCL into the strategy is to 
build a strong partnership with the Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI). The UASI’s 
have been working with the TCL as part of the grant guidance issued by the Department 
of Homeland Security for the last funding cycles. The UASIs, like the state of Florida, 
has spent grant money on building capabilities for their assigned jurisdictions. A 




capabilities for the state. Once the inventory is completed, each Regional Domestic 
Security Task Force would have a blueprint of the capabilities available to respond to any 
scenario.     
Upon completion of the statewide inventory, the next sequence should be to 
determine the baseline capability each RDSTF should possess for any given scenario. 
Florida Homeland Security Leadership should select a major hurricane, which is one of 
the fifteen (15) National Planning Scenarios listed in the TCL.  Florida has been subject 
to the most devastating terrorist of record, “Mother Nature.” Mother Nature by way of 
hurricanes has caused more destruction and death to Florida so far than any other national 
planning scenario or terrorist organization. Hurricanes have also touched in some form 
each of the seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces of the state. Determining the 
capabilities needed to respond to and recover from a major hurricane will differ by region 
based on population and threat. Nevertheless, all regions will need a certain amount of 
capability to enhance its resilience. Once that framework and capability has been reached, 
the Florida Leadership should then move to another national planning scenario such as 
aerosol anthrax (which has occurred in Palm Beach County, FL) or an improvised 
explosive device (IED). This will create a building block foundation and many of the 
capabilities could be used for more than one scenario. Capabilities-Based Planning 
overarching theme is to build a system that is flexible, adaptable and can be built upon as 
new potential threats are discovered in the future. The system is designed to be a national 
network with one game plan.  
Previous interviews of Florida Homeland Security Leaders identified the multi-
discipline and RDSTF approach as a major strength of the program. A weakness 
identified from the interviews is the overlap or lack of clarity between Florida State 
Statute 252 entitled Emergency Management and State Statute 943 entitled Department 
of Law Enforcement. State Statute 943 identifies the Regional Domestic Security Task 
Force as terrorism centric not all hazards. The TCL is an all hazard Capabilities-Based 
approach. To fully engage the TCL, Florida should look to modify FSS 943 and FSS 252 
to make the RDSTF the mechanism to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover  
 
 42
from any catastrophic event. The domestic security strategy could also identify the 
RDSTF as the regional organization to help counties and cities when more capabilities 
are needed to enhance a first response effort. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FLORIDA’S NEXT JOURNEY 
IN THE NEW PARADIGM OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
Shortly after the 9/11 event, Florida Leadership drafted the state’s first Domestic 
Security Strategy. The strategy was one of the first in the nation. The strategy has aided 
the state in building its capabilities to respond and recover from major catastrophic 
disasters. After comparing other states’ Homeland Security Strategies and interviews of 
several Florida Homeland Security Leaders, it is recommended to draft the next 
generation of the strategy and make enhancements to the Domestic Security Program. 
The strategy has several strengths, which need to be carried forward to be the foundation 
for the next iteration of the strategy and program.  
Building on the strengths and opportunities and being ever vigilant of the 
weaknesses and threats can build resilience for Florida. This thesis recommends Florida 
review the following recommendations for potential implementation as part of the 
Domestic Security Program: 
1. Create a Strategic Planning Cell comprising key stakeholders, which 
reports to the Domestic Security Oversight Council. 
2. Rewrite the State’s Domestic Security Strategy with special emphasis 
towards vision, mission, and the Target Capabilities List (Activities, 
Tasks, Measures, and Metrics). 
3. Embrace Capabilities-Based Planning Model as the foundation of 
Florida’s Regional Domestic Security Task Force Program. 
4. Establish the Regional Domestic Security Task Force as an all hazards 
model to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover from all 
catastrophic disasters.   
A. INSTITUTE A STRATEGIC PLANNING CELL 
The Cell should be comprised of key stakeholders from throughout the state. Each 
of the Seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces, Five Urban Area Security 
Initiatives (UASI), and certain key agency leaders should comprise the team. The team 
should further have a multi-discipline flavor to engage as many stakeholders as possible.  
The primary responsibility of the Cell is to draft the next state domestic security strategy. 
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The state strategy being developed in this manner has a better chance of being accepted 
statewide. A secondary responsibility will be to implement any changes identified by the 
Department of Homeland Security via their annual federal homeland security grant 
guidance. A participative process with all appropriate stakeholders can build the next 
iteration of the state’s domestic security strategy that will meet many of the GAO 
desirable characteristics. Formulation of the Cell will then start the process of continuous 
strategic thinking for the state.  
B. REWRITE FLORIDA’S DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY 
Interviews of Florida Homeland Security Leaders overwhelmingly believe the 
present Florida Domestic Security Strategy needs to be updated to enhance Florida’s 
Domestic Security Program. The Strategic Planning Cell or another body of prominent 
stakeholders needs to be empanelled to complete a comprehensive review of the present 
strategy. The next iteration can build on Florida’s positive core, the multi-discipline 
Regional Domestic Security Task Force Model (RDSTF). Roles and responsibilities of 
the RDSTF need to be established via the next strategy. A new vision and mission 
statement could be the placeholder for defining the RDSTF. The vision statement needs a 
battle cry such as One Team – One Fight or something else that the numerous people 
involved in Homeland Security for the State of Florida can buy into which gives people 
the highest hopes for the future. A vision is inclusive of the constituents’ aspirations; it is 
an ideal and unique image of the future for the common good (Kouzes, 1997, p. 124). 
The Department of Homeland Security has published the Target Capability List 
(TCL) for the nation. The goal is to better prepare the nation to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from major disasters. The designated Florida Urban Area 
Security Initiatives (UASI) has adopted the TCL as part of their homeland security 
strategies based on the Department of Homeland Security grant guidance for the 
program. The TCL is a guide to help increase the nation’s preparedness.  
Florida needs to incorporate the TCL into the next version of Florida’s Domestic 
Security Strategy. Utilizing the TCL approach would create a common language or 
thought process for the state. The synergy or strength of selecting a unified approach 
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would then set the tone for other governmental entities and stakeholders throughout the 
state to adopt the same ideology. The TCL is divided into five different capability 
sections, which correspond to Florida’s present five overarching goals of the strategy. 
This commonality will eliminate the need of Florida from starting from ground zero.    
The TCL identifies activities, tasks, measures, and metrics for each of the mission 
areas. Past iterations of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy have lacked this depth. The 
Strategic Planning Cell or empanelled body can review the hundreds of pages in the TCL 
and select those critical capabilities Florida should pursue over the next coming years.  
Florida, by embracing the TCL, can put the document to the test. The TCL is a 
guide and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) realizes that by moving through 
this new paradigm of homeland security changes and capabilities will occur along this 
journey. Who better to challenge the document than Florida who developed one of the 
first homeland security strategies in the country? DHS, in fact, requests changes or 
recommendations on the TCL. Florida should seize the moment. 
C. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING MODEL AS THE FOUNDATION 
OF FLORIDA’S REGIONAL DOMESTIC SECURITY TASK FORCE 
PROGRAM 
Capabilities-Based Planning can be seen as a way to combine the strengths of the 
threat-based and scenario-based planning methods while maintaining the required level 
for flexibility given the evolving nature of the threat (Goss, 2005, p. 15) Once Florida 
accepts the TCL as a statewide protocol, the next phase to strengthen the state’s 
preparedness can take hold by completing a statewide region-by-region assessment of the 
available capabilities. The assessment will be used to establish the minimal baseline 
capabilities each region should possess and sustain. The next step will be to overlay the 
UASI’s capabilities that have been developed since the inception of the federal program.  
The final phase will be to prioritize based on limited resources the next capability 
to be established in each region. The underlining premise is that not all regions are the 
same. Some regions will need more capabilities based on threat and population. 
Moreover, no region can stand-alone and hope to respond and recover to a major 
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catastrophic event by it self. The region will need help, Florida hurricane history proves 
the point that no region can recover by itself. The recovery may be accelerated if the 
impacted region understands that the remaining six have the same capabilities and 
protocols as them. Standardization can help make sense during a chaotic event.  
D. STRENGTHEN THE REGIONAL DOMESTIC SECURITY TASK FORCE 
MODEL  
The pinnacle of Florida’s Domestic Security Strategy is the Regional Domestic 
Security Task Force (RDSTF) concept. Interviews for this thesis of Florida Homeland 
Security Leaders bears testament to this fact. Presently, the RDSTF has been identified 
for terrorism related events, which makes the model terrorism centric. Capabilities that 
are built for terrorism can also be used for response to a litany of other disasters. The 
RDSTF needs to be an all-hazard approach. Modifications in Florida State Statute 
Chapters 943 and 252 would be the mechanism for this change. The state domestic 
security strategy is an all-hazard approach; by designating the RDSTF, an all-hazard 
model would bring clarity to its mission. 
A final adjustment in hopes of strengthening the states’ domestic security 
program will be to identify a seat on the Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) 
for the Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI). The DSOC was established to provide 
executive oversight over the state’s domestic security efforts and approves the State 
Homeland Security Strategy. This seat will establish a strong partnership between the 
DSOC and the UASI. This partnership will help in determining the capabilities the region 
and the UASI will need to provide for the citizens in a designated area. A strong 
partnership will go a long way in identifying capabilities and leveraging available federal 
grant dollars for homeland security. 
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APPENDIX.  2007 FLORIDA DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGY 
 
 
Approved by SWG Executive Board on June 7, 2007 
Approved by the DSOC on August 8, 2007 
 








Strengthen our coordinated capability to prepare, prevent, protect, 
respond, and recover from all hazards through interdisciplinary and 
interagency consensus and commitment to build and rely on a strong 
Regional Collaboration. 
 
GOAL 1: PREPARE for terrorism response missions. 
 
OBJECTIVE 1.1  PLANNING:  Preparedness Plans incorporate an accurate 
hazard analysis and risk assessment and ensure that capabilities required to 
prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks 
and catastrophic natural disasters are available when and where they are needed. 
 
OBJECTIVE 1.2  COMMUNICATIONS:  A continuous flow of critical 
information is maintained as appropriate between multi-jurisdictional and multi-
disciplinary emergency responders, command posts, lead and support agencies, and 
the governmental officials for the duration of the emergency response operation in 
compliance with National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
 
OBJECTIVE 1.3  RISK MANAGEMENT:  State, regional, local, tribal and 
private sector entities, in coordination with Federal participation, identify and 
assess risks, prioritize and select appropriate protection, prevention, and mitigation 
solutions based on reduction of risk, monitor the outcomes of allocation decisions, 
and undertake corrective actions. 
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OBJECTIVE 1.4  COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND PARTICIPATION: 
There is a structure and a process for on-going collaboration between government 
and non-governmental resources at all levels. 
 
GOAL 2: PREVENT, preempt and deter acts of terrorism. 
 
OBJECTIVE 2.1  INFORMATION GATHERING AND RECOGNITION OF 
INDICATORS AND WARNINGS:  Threat and other criminal and/or terrorism-
related information is identified, gathered, entered into an appropriate 
data/retrieval system, and provided to appropriate analysis centers. 
 
OBJECTIVE 2.2  INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION: Timely, 
accurate, and actionable intelligence/information products are produced in support 
of prevention, awareness, deterrence, response, and continuity planning operations. 
 
OBJECTIVE 2.3  INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION SHARING AND 
DISSEMINATION:  Effective and timely sharing of information and intelligence 
occurs across Federal, State, local, tribal, regional, and private sector entities to 
achieve coordinated awareness of, prevention of, protection against, and response to 
a threatened or actual domestic terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency. 
 
OBJECTIVE 2.4  LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATION AND 
OPERATIONS:  Suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland 
security are successfully deterred, detected, disrupted, investigated, and 
apprehended. 
 
OBJECTIVE 2.5  CBRNE DETECTION:  Chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and/or explosive (CBRNE) materials are rapidly detected and 
characterized at borders, critical locations, events, and incidents. 
 
GOAL 3: PROTECT Florida’s citizens, visitors, and critical 
infrastructure. 
 
OBJECTIVE 3.1  CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:  The risk 
to, vulnerability of, and consequence of attack to critical infrastructure are reduced 
through the identification and protection of critical infrastructure. 
 
OBJECTIVE 3.2  FOOD AND AGRICULTURE SAFETY AND DEFENSE: 
Threats to food and agriculture safety are prevented, mitigated, and eradicated. 
 
OBJECTIVE 3.3  EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE AND 
INVESTIGATION:  Potential exposure and disease is rapidly identified to contain 
the spread of the event and reduce number of cases. 
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OBJECTIVE 3.4  PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY TESTING:  Chemical, 
radiological, and biological agents causing, or having the potential to cause, 
widespread illness or death are rapidly detected and accurately identified by the 
public health laboratory within the jurisdiction or through network collaboration 
with other appropriate local, state, and federal laboratories. 
 
GOAL 4: RESPOND in an immediate, effective, and 
coordinated manner, focused on the victims of the attack. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.1  ON-SITE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT:  The incident is 
managed safely, effectively, and efficiently through the integration of facilities, 
resources (personnel, equipment, supplies, and communications), and procedures 
using a common organizational structure that is the Incident Command System 
(ICS), as defined in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.2  EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MANAGEMENT: 
The event is effectively managed through multi-agency coordination for a pre-
planned or no-notice event through the Emergency Operations Center 
Management. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.3  CRITICAL RESOURCE LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION: 
Critical resources are available to incident managers and emergency responders 
upon request for proper distribution and to aid disaster victims in a cost-effective 
and timely manner. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.4  VOLUNTEER AND DONATIONS MANAGEMENT:  The 
coordination of volunteers and donations is maximized and does not hinder 
response and recovery activities. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.5  RESPONDER SAFETY AND HEALTH:  No illness or injury 
to any first responder, first receiver, medical facility staff member, or other skilled 
support personnel as a result of preventable exposure after the initial incident or 
during decontamination and incident follow-up. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.6  PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY RESPONSE:  The 
incident scene is assessed and secured, while protecting first responders and 
mitigating any further effect to the public at risk. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.7  ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY SUPPORT:  Foreign 
animal disease is prevented from entering Florida by protecting the related critical 
infrastructure and key assets; equipment, trained teams, and personnel surge plans 





OBJECTIVE 4.8  ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH:  After the primary event, 
disease and injury are prevented through the quick identification of associated 
environmental hazards to include exposure to infectious diseases that are secondary 
to the primary event and secondary transmission modes. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.9  EXPLOSIVE DEVICE RESPONSE OPERATIONS:  Threat 
assessments are conducted, the explosive and/or hazardous devices are rendered 
safe, and the area is cleared of hazards.  
 
OBJECTIVE 4.10  FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS/SUPPORT:  Dispatch and 
safe arrival of the initial fire suppression resources occurs within jurisdictional 
response time objectives. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.11  WMD/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RESPONSE 
DECONTAMINATION:  Hazardous materials release is rapidly identified and 
mitigated; victims exposed to the hazard are rescued, decontaminated, and treated; 
the impact of the release is limited; and responders and at risk populations are 
effectively protected. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.12  CITIZEN EVACUATION AND SHELTER-IN-PLACE: 
Affected and at-risk populations (and companion animals) are safely sheltered-in-
place and/or evacuated to safe refuge areas, and effectively and safely reentered into 
the affected area, if appropriate. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.13  ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE:  Individuals who are ill, 
exposed, or likely to be exposed are separated, movement is restricted, basic 
necessities of life are available, and their health is monitored in order to limit the 
spread of a newly introduced contagious disease (e.g., pandemic influenza). 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.14  URBAN SEARCH & RESCUE:  The greatest numbers of 
victims (human and animal) are rescued and transferred to medical or mass care 
capabilities, in the shortest amount of time, while maintaining rescuer safety. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.15  EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING: 
Government agencies and public and private sectors receive and transmit 
coordinated, prompt, useful, and reliable information regarding threats to their 
health, safety, and property, through clear, consistent information delivery systems. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.16  TRIAGE AND PRE-HOSPITAL TREATMENT:  Emergency 
Medical Services (EMS) resources are effectively and appropriately dispatched and 
provide pre-hospital triage, treatment, transport, tracking of patients, and 
documentation of care appropriate for the incident, while maintaining the 
capabilities of the EMS system for continued operations. 
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OBJECTIVE 4.17  MEDICAL SURGE:  Injured or ill from the event are rapidly 
and appropriately cared for. Continuity of care is maintained for non-incident 
related illness or injury. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.18  MEDICAL SUPPLIES MANAGEMENT AND 
DISTRIBUTION:  Critical medical supplies and equipment are appropriately 
secured, managed, distributed, and restocked in a timeframe appropriate to the 
incident. 
OBJECTIVE 4.19  MASS PROPHYLAXIS:  Appropriate drug prophylaxis and 
vaccination strategies are implemented in a timely manner upon the onset of an 
event to prevent the development of disease in exposed individuals. Public 
information strategies include recommendations on specific actions individuals can 
take to protect their family, friends, and themselves. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.20  MASS CARE (SHELTERING, FEEDING, AND RELATED 
SERVICES):  Mass care services (sheltering, feeding, bulk distribution) are rapidly 
provided for the population and companion animals within the affected area. 
 
OBJECTIVE 4.21 FATALITY MANAGEMENT:  Complete documentation and 
recovery of human remains, personal effects, and items of evidence are achieved 
(except in cases where the health risk posed to personnel outweigh the benefits of 
recovery of remains and personal effects).  
 
GOAL 5: RECOVER quickly and restore our way of life 
following a terrorist act. 
 
OBJECTIVE 5.1  STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND MITIGATION 
ASSESSMENT:  Restore affected areas to pre-event conditions. 
 
OBJECTIVE 5.2  RESTORATION OF LIFELINES:  Sufficient lifelines services 
are available to safely support ongoing recovery activities. 
 
OBJECTIVE 5.3  ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY RECOVERY:  Economic 
impact is estimated, priorities are set for recovery activities, business disruption is 
minimized and returned to operation, and individuals and families are provided 
with appropriate levels and types of relief with minimal delay. 
 
Approved by SWG Executive Board June 7, 2007 
Approved by the DSOC on August 8, 2007 
 
Florida Domestic Security Strategy. ( 2007, August 8). Retrieved April 27, 2008, from 
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Domestic_Security/Library/State/Stratgey.pdf 
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